Master's Degree Capstone Paper 2012

(What follows is my master's capstone paper, completed in June 2012)

Some Historical Factors of Executive Order 9981

Final Capstone Project

Jonathan Romeo

Dr. Bob Wintermute

May 18, 2012

On July 28, 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order 9981 desegregating the United States military. However, the history of Executive Order 9981 does not begin, nor does it end, on July 28, 1948. Its history is much longer than a single day and involves more players than just President Truman. Some historians have focused on Truman’s issuing of Executive Order 9981 calling it a ploy to either gain or keep African American votes in the bruising 1948 presidential election.[1] Other historians assert Truman overcame his Southern upbringing and signed Executive Order 9981 to right previous wrongs committed against African Americans.[2] What is certain is that Truman faced challenges from both within his own party–– the Dixiecrats on the right and the Progressives on the left–– and the Republican Party. With threat of losing the 1948 election why did Truman tackle such a politically charged issue? It is the thesis of this paper that Truman’s decision to desegregate the military was the result of a complex set of factors beyond African American votes and personal redemption including the mistreatment of African American soldiers by military leaders in preparation for service in World War I, the combat performance of the 368^th during World War I, post-World War I riots, the Army and Navy’s refusal to use African Americans as more than menial laborers, the mistreatment of returning African American veterans, the growing political power of African Americans like A. Philip Randolph, the Army War College studies in the interwar period which justified the continued discrimination with regard to African Americans in the military services including reliance on the “separate but equal” doctrine, the use of African American troops as servants for officers, the successful combat record of the Tuskegee Airmen, the positive interactions between white and African pilots, and the positive results of the limited integration during the Battle of the Bulge. This paper examines these factors and argues that they too influenced Truman’s decision to enact Executive Order 9981.

Some of the roots of Executive Order 9981 can be traced to the World War I period: the treatment and training of African Americans before they were deployed, the actions of African Americans and their leaders during the war, and the riots that occurred in the aftermath of the war. The experiences of this period shaped the mindset of both military leaders and the African American community when the Allies were once again engaged in a war against Germany. More importantly, the military leadership involved with desegregating the military after World War II, including Truman, were participants in or had knowledge of actions that occurred during World War I.

During World War I, the African American civil rights leader and writer, W.E.B. Du Bois called for all African Americans to set aside their grievances against white America and join the fight against the Germans. Although Du Bois’s “Closed Ranks” philosophy had many critics it was thought by some progressive reformers that “the mobilization of American society for war represented an opportunity to harness the powers of the federal government to their particular cause were wildly optimistic.”[3] Du Bois argued African American’s active involvement in the war “could bring political and economic gains to the black America.”[4]

Roughly 367,410 were selected for service from the more than 2 million registered African Americans.[5] This number represents 13 percent of all able-bodied African American men.[6] At first this relatively high number would seem to indicate a willingness on the part of the military to accept African Americans into the military. However, the numbers are misleading and, according to Paul T. Murray, an indicator of draft board racism.[7] Members of the draft boards, mostly white, gave more deferments to whites than they did to African Americans. Qualified whites volunteered before being drafted while qualified African American volunteers were limited to 4,000.[8] Perhaps the worst case of racism was the thought, on the part of many draft board members, that an African American man in an army uniform was one that a white man would otherwise have to fill.[9] The feeling among draft board members was that it was okay to save a white man from the war at the expense of an African American. However, as Murray points out, “the major concern of black Americans was the fight against exclusion from the military.”[10] The draft was eagerly accepted as proof of the Negro's Americanism. “Any shirking of military duty was feared as a possible justification for continued discrimination in civilian society.”[11]

Only 11 percent, roughly 42,000, of the African Americans in uniform were assigned to combat units[12] while 150,000 were assigned as stevedores and laborers commanded by Southern officers who the War Department felt were better suited for the task than Northerners because they had “ample experience motivating black laborers in the rural South.”[13] Soldiers who were to be trained for combat were often stationed at camps in the South.

In what can be seen as foreshadowing for events that would follow the war, riots and racist actions broke out in the Southern cities where African American soldiers trained. White Southerners were the root cause of these riots. Although the military did not encourage these riots it did very little in the way of standing by the African American soldiers. Most of the African American soldiers would train in segregated facilities and in places like Manhattan, Kansas and Houston, Texas where Jim Crow laws were enforced.

In Houston, African American soldiers of the 3rd Battalion 24th Infantry refused to comply with the Houston’s Jim Crow Laws. When the African American soldiers in Houston “were unwilling to display what whites deemed proper subservience” they were met with hostile words, threats, and racial slurs.[14] On August 23, 1917, armed African Americans clashed with armed white Houstonians. The clash, set off by the beating and arrest of two African American military police officers by white civilian officers, ended with in the death of 15 white civilians[15] and 4 African American soldiers.[16] Sixteen soldiers were hanged and 65 were given life sentences.[17] It has been argued the death sentence given to the African American soldiers was done in order to “appease and avenge racist white Houstonians and Southerners.”[18]

On March 28, 1918, in Manhattan, Kansas, Major General Charles C. Ballou issued Bulletin No. 35 to the African Americans stationed at Camp Funston after an altercation broke out between an African American soldier and a local theatre owner over either the price of a ticket[19] or the seating accommodations.[20] It has been argued that Ballou’s bulletin only restricted the soldiers to the base.[21]Although Ballou didn’t directly order the soldiers to remain on base, the wording of the document leaves little room for misinterpretation. Ballou writes, “Division Commander has repeatedly urged that all colored members of his command…should refrain from going where their presences will be resented.”[22] What makes the bulletin more disturbing is the fact Ballou knew the theatre owner was “legally wrong,” but sided with the theatre owner because the situation would have never occurred if the African American soldier had not been there in the first place.[23] As it is, Ballou’s Bulletin No. 35 is a good example of the military enforcing Jim Crow. Ballou would later call for the black officers in the 92^nd Division to be court-martialed for cowardice after the division retreated during the Meuse-Argonne offensive in France.[24]

Bulletins and orders such as these did not stop when the African American soldiers reached France. The American military issued French commanders, who had African American soldiers under their command, instructions on how to treat African Americans. The document was written by the American military because of the nature of the relationship between French soldiers, officers, civilians, and African Americans. The French, in the eyes of the American military, were guilty of treating African Americans as equals. The document “Secret Information Concerning Black American Troops,” distributed on August 7, 1918 by French Colonel Linard, makes it quite clear that the American military expected the French to enforce Jim Crow laws on the American soldiers under their command.[25]

Further attempts by the Army to promote Jim Crow laws in Europe came from an order issued by Brigadier General James B. Erwin. Rumors that the soldiers in the 92^nd Division were raping French women had reached high levels of military command. Although there was no evidence of these rapes, the white American military officers took the stance of “guilty until proven innocent” towards African American soldiers.[26] As a result on December 26, 1918, Erwin ordered that African American soldiers were not authorized to speak with French women.[27] Arrests of many African Americans by the Army’s military police resulted from the order.[28]

Although racism was not unique to the United States, the fact that the military attempted to export the Jim Crow laws of the American South to other parts of the world is unique. It was an attempt on the military’s part to keep the African American subjugated by oppressive and immoral laws far from the shores of the United States. In some cases, as with the case with the French soldiers and officers who refused to comply with the order, the attempt failed; the military’s propaganda did not work.[29]

The two important regiments that have a bearing on this paper are the 368^th Infantry Regiment of the 92^nd Division and the 369th Infantry Regiment of the 93^rd Division. The 369^th were given to the French who desperately needed the manpower. The 368^th remained with the American military. The story of these two African American regiments may have had the same beginning, but their endings are completely different.

By all accounts, the 369^th, including the Fifteenth New York National Guard, conducted themselves as a military unit should in spite of the obstacles in their way. For their actions in combat, the 369^th received “high praise from its French commander.”[30] They never lost ground or had a man captured.[31] Privates Henry Johnson and Needham Roberts were awarded the Croix de Gurre. The 369^th was awarded a regimental Croix de Guerre, one of the highest French military awards.[32] Because of their fierce fighting the Germans gave the 369^th the nickname, “Hell Fighters.”[33]

 However, it was not the actions of the 369^th that would be remembered when African Americans would once again be involved in a world war. Instead, the actions of the 368^th would be used as evidence to limit African American participation in the military. The military would twist the fact surrounding the 368^th wartime record to substantiate their claim that African Americans made poor soldiers.[34]

The 92^nd Division, in which the 368^th was a part, was formed after successful appeals for the inclusion of African Americans in the army to the government by African American newspapers.[35]  The commander in charge of the division was General Charles Ballou, the same general who had issued Bulletin No. 15 effectively keeping African American soldiers confined to Camp Funston in Manhattan, Kansas.[36]

The 368^th was one of many regiments involved in the vicious fighting during the Meuse-Argonne offensive launched on September 26, 1918 and ending October 5. Under the conditions it seems the members of the 368^th fought to the best of their abilities, but hampered by various factors they ended up retreating from the Germans. Divisional training had been poor compared to white regiments. The training of the 368^th’s African American officers, received at segregated facilities in places like De Moines, Iowa, was not on a par with training given to white officers in other regiments. Compounding matters, the morale of the men in the regiment had declined over the course of the campaign[37] due to the wide spread rumors that members of the 92^nd Division were raping French women.[38] Once in battle, the 368^th were ordered to charge the German positions. However, they received no advance artillery fire, lacked maps of the area, and were not equipped with wire cutters to clear the terrain of barbed wire.[39] The 368^th found themselves under constant bombardment from German artillery. To make matters worse communications between the 368^th and the rear had broken down. Taking these factors into account, it should have been apparent to the military why the 368^th retreated. However, the white military officers determined it was the African Americans’ fault and not the fault of white leadership.[40]

U.S. Army leadership had not expected much from the African American soldiers in its ranks.[41] Because the 368^th’s training was worse than the French trained 369^th, the regiment “responded by performing pretty much as the white generals expected.”[42] The case of the 368^th was a self-fulfilling prophecy on the part of the army. They did not train the soldiers well enough to face trench warfare because the army leadership was sure they would not fight as well as white soldiers. As a result, 368^th, in the eyes of army leadership, failed in their duties.

Years later, before signing Executive Order 9981, President Truman recalled the situation in African American soldiers faced during World War I. He had served next to the 93^rd Division, which included the 369^th, commanded by the French and had only positive memories of the soldiers. The 92^nd Division, which included the 368^th, Truman remembered, “did not measure up in combat.”[43] Concerned as to why the French-trained 369^th outperformed the American trained 368^th, Truman conducted his own casual research into the matter. The conclusion he came to was that the French trained African Americans performed better because the division had been integrated with French soldiers “in conditions of equality.”[44] For Truman “non-segregation was the answer because that was the only way in which ability and training were the sole basis for selecting leaders.”[45] As a captain of an artillery battery during World War I, soldiers under Truman’s command also fled when German shelling became too much for them to handle. Truman chalked up his unit’s retreat to the fact that it was their first test under fire.[46] Like the soldiers under Truman’s command who retreated from German fire it was not cowardice that caused the 368^th to retreat.

One important factor in the 368^th’s retreat was the racist notions the military leadership had concerning the fighting ability of African Americans. The lack of training and support given to African American soldiers would continue during the interwar years and into World War II. With an asymmetric amnesia concerning the performance of African Americans in World War I––forgetting the valor of one unit while embellishing the retreat of another––the wartime performances of the 368^th factored into Executive Order 9981 because the same opportunities for training were not available to everyone. It was a problem that his executive order would correct.

African American participation in World War I did not result in the changes Du Bois had hoped. Post-World War I America saw the escalation of race riots across the country. The summer of 1919 has been called the “Red Summer” because of the bloodshed during countless riots that occurred across the country.[47] In the South, African American soldiers were forcibly stripped of their uniforms by whites and lynched, burned, or sometimes both.[48] In 1921, the National Guard was brought into Tulsa, Oklahoma to restore peace after a riot broke out that threatened to destroy the entire city. The result of the National Guard assault combined with local whites was the destruction of Deep Greenwood––the Black Wall Street of America.[49] Hundreds of people, mostly African Americans, died during the interwar period. The monetary damages due to rioting ranged into the millions of dollars.[50] Many whites blamed African Americans for these riots because “foreign influences, especially the association on the basis of equality with the French during the War and the propaganda of the Bolshevists after the war…caused blacks to fight back.”[51] War had given African Americans a taste of what equality could be like, but when they returned home there was still no equality in society or in the military. Even worse than white citizens attacking African Americans was the government’s use of the military against African Americans, many of whom were veterans, during these riots. Although it may not seem that riots in American cities would factor into Truman’s Executive Order 9981 the fact that they occurred, and would occur during World War II, highlighted a problem within society that could not be ignored once Truman became president.

Military demobilization after World War I sent many African American soldiers, as well as whites, back to their civilian lives. The military feared that the declining number of whites would give African Americans a numerical advantage in the peacetime armed forces.[52] In order to prevent this from occurring, the military was more than willing to eliminate African Americans from the armed forces. However, laws passed by Congress after the Civil War required the Army to maintain four African American regiments whether “the regular force waxed in strength or waned”[53] and protests during the interwar years by African American leaders prevented a decline from occurring.  The Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General James. G. Harbord, in 1922, wrote that it “was an absurdity that with the reduction of the Army the War Department should be obliged to maintain these four regiment of colored soldiers.”[54] Harbord went on to say that taken to “the logical extreme” the army would eventually be made up of only African Americans.[55] Although the military tried to reassure African Americans the their intentions were not to eliminate African Americans from the military, its actions told another story.

In order to prevent a higher ratio of African Americans, and circumvent established law, the Army in July of 1919 ended African American enlistments into the cavalry[56] followed by ending enlistments into the infantry.[57] As the Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General James G. Harbord was only one of the many Army officers who thought that eliminating an entire African American regiment was in the best interest of the Army.[58] However, problems arose which made any further attempts of reducing African Americans in the Army impractical. African Americans, from the 9^th Cavalry, returning from the Philippines had to be placed in a stateside unit. If the Army went through with disbanding either the 24^th Infantry or the 25^th Infantry, the Army would have no choice but to place a black regiment in the same brigade as a white regiment. However, the segregationist policies the military in force would not allow for this to occur.[59] 

Over-manning became a problem for the Army in 1926 when Congress authorized the creation of the Army Air Corps. Congress had approved in an increase in the numbers for the Air Corps but did not change the size of the Army. As military members left the Army, the War Department would shift these openings from the Army to the Air Corps. This practice worked as long as there were openings in the Army that could be shifted to the Air Corps. Once there were no more openings that could be shifted to the Air Corps, the Army started moving openings from the African American regiments to the Air Corps. As the number of openings in the African Americans regiments ran out the elaborate shell game the Army had devised came to an end. In order to meet the required number of soldiers and pilots in the Air Corps, the Army planned on disbanding the 10^th Cavalry and the 25^th Infantry. This maneuver would create more openings in the Army that could be shifted to the Army Air Corp.[60] At one point in time the Army had considered doing away with all the African American regiments but feared that doing so would “arouse too much public resentment.”[61]

Unlike the Army, the Navy did not segregate by units instead it segregated by the occupations which were open to African Americans. Like the Army, the Navy showed no indication during the interwar years that it would desegregate or offer African Americans any positions outside of menial labor.[62]

Over the course of Navy history strict segregation had not been the rule. African Americans had served in the Navy since the Revolutionary War. During the Revolutionary War, the Navy recruited African Americans who had had experience in the merchant marine and in whaling fleets. Whites and blacks worked together, ate in the same galley, and shared the same shipboard quarters. However, this tradition would change when the Navy started recruiting outside of port cities and into the interior of America. The Navy became more selective in its recruitment. Believing that most white Americans would not serve side-by-side with African Americans, the Navy began to limit the number of African American recruits. At the same time, positions open to African Americans were also becoming limited.[63]

As the power of the United States grew so did the prestige of the Navy. It was believed by top naval officials that only “white-native born crews” should be used on ships.[64] Furthermore, it was their belief that African Americans could not protect “white, American civilization.”[65] These feelings would only become stronger as time went on. The Navy stopped all African American enlistments at the end of World War I. When the Navy recommenced recruitment of African Americans in 1933, they were only assigned as stewards.[66] Richard Dalfiume has argued that the Army modeled their course of segregation after the Navy. After World War I, the Army, much like the Navy, sought to limit the involvement of African Americans as much as possible.[67]

Elimination of the segregation of the African Americans by the Navy and the Army is at the heart of Executive Order 9981. The willingness of the military to use African Americans as nothing more than manual laborers factored into the executive order that sought “equality of treatment and opportunity for all.”[68] The military was ignoring the fact that African Americans as soldiers and sailors, who could be used in more areas, were more “mission critical” than another stevedore or manual laborer. Executive Order 9981 would put an end to this, but not before the military had used different ways to keep segregation intact.

In 1922, a plan on how to mobilize African American manpower in future wars was developed by the War Department General Staff. The report read, in part, “Military realities and not ‘social, ethnological and psychological theories’ must be the deciding factors in determining the use to be made of Negro manpower.”[69] However, the military relied on these very types of theories to limit African American involvement in the military. The War Department used pseudo-science in many of the studies it conducted during the interwar years to keep the military a segregated institution.

In 1925, the Army War College released “The Use of Negro Manpower in War.” The study based much of its “findings” on data collected from intelligence tests the military conducted during World War I in order to make sure that qualified men were placed in positions according to their “mental abilities.”[70]  The study was also based on the flawed analysis of the 368 Regiment’s wartime record.[71]

The War College determined African Americans were less intelligent than whites because their cranial cavity was smaller and the brain weighed less.[72] The study stated, as a matter of fact, that “it is generally recognized that the pure blood American Negro is inferior to our white population in mental capacity.”[73] When African Americans did score high on the IQ tests, the War College wrote it off because of the “heavy strain of white blood” they had coursing through their veins.[74]

The African American, the studied argued, had no interest in fighting for the United States. Their only interests were in advancing their “own racial interests.”[75] The study made many claims, absolute in nature, which would seem difficult to prove or disprove. The study made statements such as “All officers, without exception, agree that the Negro lacks initiative, displays little or no leadership, and cannot accept responsibility” and “an opinion held in common by practically all officers is that the negro is a rank coward in the dark”[76] The only way these blanket statements could be true is if every single officer, or a very large number of officers, in the military had been polled.

According to Major General H.E. Ely, the commandant of the Army War College, the study was conducted in order to ensure “military efficiency.”[77] The study concluded that although African Americans could be used in the event of war, they should be “organized in segregated units commanded primarily by carefully selected white officers.”[78] Military effectiveness for the War College, as demonstrated by this study, was keeping the military segregated. The study, Ely stated, was “eminently fair” to African Americans.[79]

The more important issue of the study is not that it is filled with inaccuracies and stereotypes which were in unfair to African Americans, but that the military’s, and civilian society’s, racist idea that “blacks were mentally inferior to whites”[80] was made part of the overall military ideology. The military’s ideology that African Americans were inferior would be used in World War II to limit their participation and as a convenient excuse to explain away any problems with African Americans.[81] Not only would the study influence field grade officers who would become commanders during World War II,[82] but the study would influence later War College studies which would argue in favor of continuing segregation as militarily effective.

Alan Gropman, in The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, has argued that we should not take the comments of the study “out of context.” The context in which Gropman defends the study is that it was conducted during a time when there was a great distrust and fear of anyone who did not fit the mold of white America.[83] The intelligence quotient (IQ) tests conducted by Robert M. Yerkes, first commissioned a major in the Army and then promoted to colonel, revealed findings that the War College chose to ignore. Yerkes and his team of psychologists tested almost 1.75 million applicants during the course of World War I. Based on the results of the tests the average IQ of all applicants, black and white, was 72. If those findings were true it would have meant that “a large portion of the soldiers in the U.S. Army had to have qualified as morons.”[84] The large portion of soldiers included whites as well as African Americans. However, the military chose to single out low scoring African Americans instead of both low scoring African Americans and low scoring whites.

The other problem was the intelligent quotient tests were flawed. Yerkes and the other psychologist assumed incorrectly that intelligence was genetic and could not be improved.[85] Alfred Binet, the psychologist credited with introducing intelligence testing in France, had argued that a person’s IQ was not hereditary and could be improved. Intelligence tests, Binet argued, were dependent on a subject’s level of education and their “innate ability.”[86] Binet further argued to test someone’s intelligence there had to be something to compare results against. Because scientists at the time did not know what a normal IQ should be they could not know a deficient score when, and if, one appeared.[87] Yerkes also discounted any cultural factors, such as education and the socioeconomic conditions of the applicant, that may have affected test scores.[88] Many African Americans tested, especially from the South, were poor and had very little education.[89]

There were others, outside of the scientific community, who were wary of IQ testing. In an investigative piece written for the New Republic, Walter Lippmann, discounted IQ testing in general. Lippmann pointed out that the tests had no objective standards and there was no real science behind these tests.[90] In his opinion, tests were a were a way of “classifying a group of people” and those tests could be turned into “an engine of cruelty.”[91] Because Lippmann was a journalist, however, and not a scientist the psychologists discounted his points of view.[92]

Gropman’s argument that the comments made by the members of the War College––based on a fear of Bolshevism and anything that was not white––may have been a valid argument. However, when the War College chose to ignore all of the facts that were at hand Gropman’s argument falls apart. What is left is that the War College chose to believe the inferiority of the African American as a “proven scientific fact.”[93]

The Army War College would release more studies regarding African Americans in the military. A 1936 study echoed many of the same sentiments as previous studies issued by the Army War College. The study, conducted in part by students who would later become influential during World War II, was what Ulysses Lee called, “One of the most complete of the brief summaries.” This study, which Lee calls a “summary example of the personality problem which commanders expected to meet in the employment of Negro troops,”[94] called African Americans “docile, tractable, lighthearted, carefree, and good natured.” At the same time the study reported African Americans were “unmoral, untruthful, and his sense of right doing is relatively inferior.”[95]

For the most part, the studies released by the military during the interwar period were a litany of racism. Many of these studies appeared to be scientific in nature, but contained no real science. The studies gave the military the support it needed to keep the number of African American in the military to a minimum and to relegate those who were admitted to menial labor within the Army and Navy. The flawed studies of the War College determined the fate of African Americans in the military for many years. The studies institutionalized a second-class citizen status upon the African American soldier. These studies had the effect of giving cover to officers who wanted to see African Americans fail as soldiers and sailors.

Regardless of the statements made by the studies, there were some members of the military who did not share the same views on segregation as the military. Colonel V.A. Caldwell disagreed with many of the assumptions the studies made. Caldwell believed that the training of African Americans was important; but Caldwell also added that it was important to train all soldiers. Caldwell believed that, if given the proper training, the African American soldier could do just as good of a job as anyone else.[96]

On the issue of segregation, Caldwell believed the Army’s policy of “messing them by themselves has not been wise… this policy should be modified by doing away with colored regiments and putting a colored unit in every regiment.”[97] Caldwell argued African Americans “will do much better where they are associated as component parts of white organizations.” He also thought the debate on whether to use African Americans or not was a waste of time because “it is quite probable that in the future as in the past circumstances will arise to compel us to have both. [African Americans and whites].” Caldwell also argued, “The National Defense problem is national not racial. It is dependent upon citizenship not on color.” [98]

In 1924, the War Department issued a questionnaire to several of its members. The questions asked whether or not African Americans should be allowed to serve in the Army and to what extent. Colonel James K. Parsons thought that there should be no segregated units in the Army. Parsons based his argument not on the notion that African Americans could not become good soldiers, but on the grounds that segregation may cause animosity, on the part of African American soldiers, towards white soldiers.[99] Executive Order 9981 would make such inquiries a moot point, but for years the military’s belief that “all officers” and soldiers felt that military segregation was a good thing hampered any hope African Americans soldiers and sailors had in improving their situation within the military.

The military used Plessy v. Ferguson to enforce segregation in the military. Arguing not only was it enforcing the Supreme Court ruling of “separate-but-equal,” but it also argued that segregation ensured military efficiency. The Navy explained its policy of using African Americans only as stewards saying it was in the best interest of shipboard efficiency because African Americans, if promoted to a leadership position, could not lead white sailors.[100] The War Department argued that it did not discriminate against anyone because segregation was not discrimination.[101] This was an argument the military would use well into World War II. The military also firmly believed it was “not responsible for the conditions favored in America nor would it be responsible for correcting any wrongs.”[102]

Although the military’s pro-segregation stance prior to and during World War II resulted in violence, military officials stood by the assertion that desegregation would “create social friction that would distract military personnel, disrupt work, and perhaps lead to violence.”[103] Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, said he was doing African Americans a favor by keeping the Navy segregated because he was “sparing them the embarrassment of having to compete against whites on equal terms.”[104] The Air Corps rationalized that it was fostering positive military effectiveness by not allowing African Americans to enlist. Allowing the enlistment of African Americans into the Air Corps would create “embarrassing social situations that could interfere with air operations.”[105] The Air Corps’ theory went that if an African American pilot were to land at an all white base it “could easily make everyone involved so uncomfortable that the quality of their work would suffer.”[106] The Marines, which are a part of the Navy and maintained their segregation policy, argued that they had not accepted African American enlistment since 1798 and would not start.[107]

In 1938, still favoring segregation, the War Department ordered that African Americans should be enlisted at the same proportion as in the civilian population. This would mean that, at the time, African Americans would have made up only 9 percent of the military. If war was to break out, and an emergency declared, African Americans would serve at “approximately the same ratio as white.”[108] The same African American to white ratio in the military did not happened following the United States’ entry into World War II nor did the enlistment of African Americans result in a representation proportional to that of the civilian population.

Days before the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the Army’s Adjutant General released a statement that contained the beliefs of the military that it would hold throughout the war, and one that the Army would use after President Truman issued Executive Order 9981. The statement read, in part, “The Army is not a sociological laboratory; to be effective it must be organized and trained according to the principles which will insure success. Experiments, to meet the wishes and demands of the champions of every race and creed for the solution of their problems are a danger to efficiency, discipline, and morale and would result in ultimate defeat.”[109] The statement further argued that the military was made up of citizens of the United States and these citizens believed in segregation. The statement was emphatic that “military orders, fiat or dicta will not change their viewpoints.”[110]

If not for the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the status of African Americans in the military could have very well remained the same. As it was, the war provided a catalyst for the advancement of African American civil rights. Even before the United States’ entry into the war, the defense industries grew by supporting the wartime needs of Allied nations. Many Americans found their personal economic situations improving. However, many African Americans who were only hired as unskilled laborers, if they were hired at all, did not benefit from defense industry growth.[111]

By the advent of World War II, many African Americans refused the “Closed Ranks” ideology Du Bois advanced during World War I. This time, African Americans were not going to set aside their struggles for equality and focus solely on the war effort. Du Bois “Closed Ranks” was replaced with the Double “V” campaign: victory overseas and victory at home. The World War II years would see many African Americans fighting for liberty overseas and other fighting for freedoms at home. African Americans would demand and protest for their rights as American citizens like never before in the nation’s history.

In late 1940, A. Phillip Randolph called for a march on Washington to protest against discrimination in the defense industries and called for the end of segregation in the military. As head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, Randolph exerted significant influence over African American opinions. When he called for thousand of marchers, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) endorsed the march adding many of its own members to those already committed to the march.[112]

The March on Washington had gathered enough supporters to worry the Roosevelt Administration. The Roosevelt Administration was fearful that 100,000 African Americans marching on Washington, DC would be seen in “Tokyo and Berlin as a weakness in Americas resolve and unity to defend itself in war.”[113] On June 25, 1941 Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802 that created the Fair Employment Practices Committee. The order also called for the elimination of segregation in the government and in industries that held government contracts.[114]

As a result of the Fair Employment Practices, the number of African Americans working in the federal government increased to more than 274,000 from 82,000. The number of African Americans working in companies that held government defense contracts also increased.[115] African Americans by the millions migrated from the South to northern cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland to take advantage of new job openings in the defense industries.[116] However, the Navy and War Departments refused to budge on their stance of segregation in the military.

In their dealings with Roosevelt and the government, African Americans had shown that they could muster the numbers needed to bring significant pressure to a political fight. The migration of African Americans from the South to major northern cities bolstered African American political power in key voting states. African Americans would use their new-found political clout to organize marches that would put pressure on the government to enact changes in the military and society. During the war, the African American media would even compare the Nazi’s racial laws to the Jim Crow laws in the South.[117]  In post-war America the idea that the United States’ racial attitudes could be compared to how Germany, under Hitler, treated the different races was an issue that President Truman knew, as leader of the most powerful country in the world, had to be remedied. The growing political power of African Americans was definitely a factor in the Truman’s decision to enact Executive Order 9981.

As the 1940 election grew closer, the issue of a segregated military was brought to the political forefront by a group of concerned African American leaders.[118] African Americans were still barred from the Marines and the Air Corps. The Navy only allowed African Americans to serve as stewards and in other menial jobs.[119]  Civil rights leaders learned the Army was using the four African American regiments more as servants for white officers than as soldiers.[120] When Roosevelt signed into law the Selective Service and Training Act on September 16, 1940, many African Americans saw it as a chance to alter the military’s segregationist policies.[121]

The law, which was the first peacetime draft in American history, called for the registration of all men between 21 and 35. The military immediately inducted 800,000 men into the service.[122] Senator Robert H. Wagner, a Democrat from New York, fought to have an antidiscrimination amendment added to the act. Many white military leaders and politicians were offended by the amendment because it contained the wording that there “shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or color.”[123] The military, the Army General Staff, and some politicians objected to the wording because it hinted at the possibility of an integrated military. Wagner had argued that the military, under no conditions, would accept “certain American citizens because of their color.”[124] The enforced segregation in the military, Wagner argued, was a policy “the Army itself ha[d] imposed on its own.”[125] Senator Tom Connally of Texas was one of the many Southern Democrats who objected to the wording proposed by Senator Wagner. Connally argued that African Americans should be allowed in the Army, but only in segregated units and that the military should not be obliged to create new units for African Americans where none had existed before.[126]

Secretary of War Harry Woodring argued if desegregation was a result of the act it would be “impossible to forecast definitely what its effect might be.”[127] However, this did not stop Woodring from making his own predictions of an integrated military. Woodring prophesized that desegregation would “demoralize and weaken the effectiveness of military units by mixing colored and white soldiers in closely related units, or even in the same units” and it would have a “dangerously adverse affect upon discipline.”[128]

The combined pressure from the military and from the more vocal politicians was enough to force an edit of the original wording of the act. Removed from the original version of the act was any wording that remotely sounded like desegregation. In its place was the guarantee that African Americans would not be “excluded from enlistment in the Army for service with colored military units.”[129] The new addition acted to further reinforce the military’s segregation policy.[130] Retained in the act, and authorized by Roosevelt, were reassurances that African Americans would have the opportunity to train as pilots, mechanics and technical specialists. Also left unadjusted in the act was the number of African Americans in the military would remain proportional to the number in the general population. At the time it would have meant 10 percent of the military would be African Americans. However, by 1941 African Americans made up only 5.9 percent of the military.[131]

            Later the same month, representatives from the African American community, A. Philip Randolph, Walter White from NAACP, and T. Arnold Hill from the National Youth Administration met with the Roosevelt and his advisors to discuss the Select Service Act’s impact on African Americans. The three leaders presented Roosevelt with a memorandum that contained the changes in the military they wished to see implemented. They wanted African Americans to be eligible to join the Air Corps and to open all fields in the Navy besides the menial labor they were performing. In addition, they also called for a greater role for African American nurses in the Army, Navy and Red Cross. The foremost of these changes was the end of desegregation in the military.[132]

            The military did not take the suggestion of White, Hill, and Randolph very seriously nor did they appreciate civilian outsiders attempting to tell them how the military should be run. The new Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, who replaced Woodring in 1940, did not want to see African American pilots in the Air Corps. He incorrectly assumed that African Americans would be failures as pilots and did not have the leadership skills that were required to become a pilot. He believed making African Americans pilots was courting disaster.[133] General George C. Marshall believed that segregation was militarily effective and any change would result in serious morale problems among white soldiers.[134]

            Based on these opinions, there were few changes made to the provisions contained within the act. Segregation would still be military policy. The number of African Americans would be proportional to the number in American society. African Americans would be allowed to attend officer candidate schools once they were opened. The act did include a provision that African Americans would be trained as pilots, mechanics and technical specialists. This training would not come from the Air Corps, civilian instructors and no commissions as Air Corps officers would be given.[135]

The government spun the story in press releases to make it sound as if White, Randolph, and Hill not only knew of the changes, but that they also approved of keeping the military segregated.[136] The backlash against the President by the African American press was great. The threat became serious enough that the White House began to fear the loss of the African American vote. Roosevelt made a series of moves in order to appease African Americans and to retain their votes in the upcoming presidential election.  As proof of his commitment, Roosevelt guaranteed African Americans would have the chance at becoming commissioned officers, including command appointments. Roosevelt promoted Colonel Benjamin Davis, Sr. to Brigadier General. Davis, who had fought in the Spanish-American War, had a long and distinguished career in the Army. Despite that, he was never promoted past colonel, a rank he received in 1930.[137] Roosevelt appointed Judge William Hastie as a special assistant to the Secretary of War Henry Stimson to advise him on African American affairs.[138] Hastie, who had previously worked in the Department of the Interior and as chairman of the National League Committee for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, had been the first African American appointed as a federal judge.[139] 

As the special assistant to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Hastie was stopped at every turn he took to change the conditions of African Americans in the Army and the Army Air Corps. By 1942, Hastie had become such a thorn in the side of the military he was no longer invited to meetings of the War Department’s Advisory Committee and the Air Command stopped consulting him on matters that affected African American pilots.[140]

On September 4 1941, Hastie issued a report to Stimson regarding the condition of African Americans in the military. The report he felt would improve not only the conditions of African Americans in the military, but would improve the military’s overall effectiveness when, and if, the United States became involved in the war. Hastie called for the creation of new regiments for the anticipated rise in the number of African American troops. He also argued for the elimination of single companies and detachments of African Americans; single units should be made apart of larger units.[141] Finally, Hastie argued that the Army should begin employing “soldiers without racial separation.”[142]

Overall, Hastie’s report was a harsh indictment on the Army’s unwillingness to use African Americans in the surface or air forces in any meaningful manner. In his report, Hastie criticized the Army for making the mores of the South “the basis of policy and practice in matters affecting the Negro soldier.”[143] By stationing the majority of African Americans in the South, the Army was creating a “dual personality which will be on the one hand a fighting man toward the foreign enemy, and on the other, a craven who will accept treatment as less than man at home.”[144] Under the system of segregation and devaluing the contribution African Americans, the Army was “squandering its resources”[145] and, until the practices of segregation and hostility had stopped, the United States and the Army would “not be an effective nation in the face of a foreign foe.”[146] 

Hastie also attempted to use the African American media as a recruitment tool to encourage African Americans to join the Army. However, Army officials stopped the plan citing a 1939 Army policy that excluded the use of recruitment funds from being used in any of African American newspapers or magazines. This policy would be lifted in 1942.[147] Among the other causes Hastie fought for was the increase of African American doctors and dentists in the military and on local draft boards. He also fought both the Army and Navy over their policy that restricted the Red Cross to use only white blood on whites and African American blood on African Americans.[148]

Hastie would resign his position in 1942 after he learned through outside sources that a segregated training base was being set up by the Army Air Force.[149] Hastie took issue with the fact the Army Air Force, which has been called a “bastion of Jim Crow” by historian Ronald Takaki,[150] decided to establish a segregated officer training school and a segregated flight school in Tuskegee, Alabama while both the Army and Navy both had desegregated officer schools.[151] Although the Army Air Force had starting cutting him out the decision making process, he still felt that the it could be an example of integration.[152] However, the work he did as the special assistant would leave a lasting impression in the War Department and other people within the government. Hastie managed to raise the number of African Americans who were accepted for officer candidate schools. He managed to improve some of the conditions on some bases and communities where African Americans were serving.[153]

Some statistics, taken out of context, make it seem as if there were great improvements made in race relations on the part of the military during World War II. By the end of the war more than 1 million African Americans, men and women, had served in the military. Half a million African Americans were stationed overseas.[154] There were 12,500 African American Seabees stationed in the Pacific Theatre.[155] The Coast Guard had 900 African Americans serving while 24,000 African Americans served as merchant marines.[156] However, by the end of the war African Americans still only made up 5.37 percent of the Navy’s enlisted ranks. A great number of those African Americans served in the steward branch.[157] Only in rare cases did African Americans actually serve side-by-side with whites.

In 1942, after the African Americans’ successful protest of the Navy’s segregation policy, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox announced the Navy would start to accept African Americans for “general service and noncommissioned officers.”[158] In the same year, the Navy’s construction battalion, the Seabees, also started taking African Americans.[159]  Before 1943 the Navy relied on volunteers to man the fleet, but manpower shortages forced the Navy to utilize the Selective Service System. At first look this would seem to be a step in the direction towards total integration of the Navy. However, the Navy created what Paul Sitwell calls “base companies” to deal with the growing number of African American sailors. These base companies, made up of stevedores, ammunition handlers, construction workers, and maintenance men, were a separate branch of the Navy designed to prevent the full-integration of the Navy.[160]

In 1944, James V. Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy, was faced with a problem in the fleet that was the direct result of the Navy’s segregation policy. White sailors started to object to the fact that they were being forced to serve back-to-back tours at sea, which greatly increased their risks of being in combat and dying, while African American sailors remained stationed ashore on Navy bases. Forrestal lifted the segregation on ships as much as he possible could. African Americans would be assigned to oilers, ammunition ships, and transporters. Eventually, African Americans would be assigned to all ships in the fleet.[161]

In October 1940, the War Department decided officer candidate schools would be desegregated. However, commanding officers, for one reason or another, chose not to recommend African Americans under their command for officer training.[162] Once the War Department became aware of the problem and issued orders that African Americans would be given the chance to go to officer candidate school did the commanding officers fall in line.[163]

In 1943, based on the recommendations of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Adlai Stevenson, the Navy finally allowed African Americans into its officer candidate school. Although there were 16 African Americans in the training course, the Navy only commissioned twelve as officers and one as a chief-warrant officer. The Golden Thirteen, as the graduates would become known as, were commissioned in March of 1944.[164]

During World War II, the Army Air Corps, under political pressure and as a result of Roosevelt’s Selective Service and Training Act relaxed its policy of not allowing African Americans to enlist.[165] The 99^th Pursuit Squadron, trained in Tuskegee, Alabama, had been originally assigned to patrol the Liberian coast. However, when the Allies invaded Africa, the Army Air Forces had no choice but to use the 99^th in the invasion operations.[166]

Segregation served to limit the effectiveness of the squadron. Once in North Africa the 99^th Pursuit Squadron was attached to the 33^rd Fighter Group made up predominantly of pilots from the South. The African American pilots received little training and even less respect from the Southern pilots. The 33^rd Fighter Group segregated the African American pilots as much as possible. Because the 99^th had little actual combat training before arriving in Africa their performance was not up to the standards set by the Army Air Forces. The pilots were accused of not being aggressive enough, not having enough desire to engage in combat, not displaying the reflexes which make a good pilot, and having no stamina.[167]

When the Allies’ Sicilian Campaign ended in 1943 white commanders Colonel William W. Moymer and Brigadier General Edwin J. House petitioned to have the 99^th Pursuit Squadron reassigned to patrol the coasts. However, at a meeting conducted by the War Department’s Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policy certain facts came to light that saved the 99^th Pursuit Squadron. The facts were there were no experienced pilots in the 99^th to teach aerial combat to the squadron, there were fewer African American pilots than white pilots so they had to fly more hours which resulted in fatigued pilots, and segregation prevented any African American pilots from being able to train with experienced white pilots.[168]

By late 1944 things had drastically changed for the 99^th Pursuit Squadron. In October, the 99^th was attached to the 79^th Fighter Group. The 79^th, under the command of Colonel Earl E. Bates, treated the African American pilots completely differently from how the 33^rd Fighter Group, and even top military leaders, had treated them. Bates, in violation of the military’s segregation policy, had the African American and white pilots conduct training and combat missions together. The experienced pilots of the 79^th were more than willing to teach the 99^th tactics they were not taught in flight school or from the 33^rd. More importantly, the white pilots treated the African Americans in a professional manner and with respect.[169]

The camaraderie that developed between the African American pilots and the white pilots in the air extended to life on the ground. African Americans and whites regularly interacted with each other in social settings like jazz concerts put on by members of both squadrons and in baseball games.[170] Despite the military’s continued stance that segregation was best for military effectiveness, the 99^th improved as a squadron when segregation, even in a limited area, was lifted and the pilots were allowed to train and live with each other instead apart from each other.

 The Army can also claim a certain amount of integration during World War II. The Army integrated many of the officer schools where it made economic sense to house African Americans and whites together and to train them in the same rooms. However, the schools where economics was not a factor remained segregated.[171] During the war base facilities such as pool and theatres were also integrated.

The Battle of the Bulge, which began in December of 1944, had severely depleted the available infantry manpower to confront the German offensive. In a case of almost integration Eisenhower, on the advice of his aide General John C. Lee, called for African Americans in the area to volunteer for training.[172] The original announcement reads like a condescending sales pitch. The Supreme Commander, the announcement read, was “happy to offer to a limited number of colored troops…the privilege of joining our veteran units at the front to deliver the knockout blow.”[173]

What caught the eye of many African American soldiers and top military officials was the reference that African Americans would be assigned to units “without regard to color or race to the units where assistance is most needed.”[174] After it was brought to Eisenhower’s attention that a situation where whites and African Americans fought side-by-side could be used by African Americans stateside to demand further integration of the Army he rewrote the request.[175] Eisenhower reworded the announcement eliminating any hint of integration. The 2,500 African American volunteers chosen were formed into fifty-three segregated platoons; all lead by white officers.[176] Although there was not the wide spread integration that was hoped for, some white platoons and African American platoons fought side-by-side against the German offensive. To Secure These Rights, a report stemming from the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, mentions Report No. ETO-82 of the Research Branch. The report contains the overall positive feelings of white soldiers who had fought with African American soldiers.[177]

However, for every step in the direction towards integrations the Army seems to have made, it would also take two steps backward. The 92^nd Infantry, fighting in the European theatre, and the 93^rd Infantry Division, fighting in the Pacific, were further targets of the Army’s racist ideals. According to Bryan Booker’s narrative about the 92^nd and 93^rd Infantry Divisions in African Americans in the United States Army in World War II, both these divisions faced brutal combat in their perspective theatres of combat.[178] Members from both divisions were decorated for actions during combat and both divisions took heavy casualties. What would stand out to Army leaders was not the heroism of the 92^nd and 93^rd, but actions that military leaders deemed as failures on the part of African Americans in these divisions.

            On the island of Bougainville, in the Pacific Ocean, unseen Japanese soldiers ambushed the 25th Regiment Combat Team; lead by Captain James J. Curran, a white officer. What followed, according to Booker, was mass confusion exacerbated by the fact that Curran had slipped into the rear and retreated leaving the rest of the regiment behind.[179] The rest of the regiment would follow suite. The 25^th Regiment’s retreat was more “proof” that African Americans could not fight. Even Secretary of War Stimson was convinced of this fact.[180] According to Booker, white officers in the division did not report to those in command that Curran fled the battle.[181] The regiment and other combat teams of the 93^rd Infantry Division would subsequently be used for more security, laboring, and training duties in quiet areas of the theater.”[182]

            The 92^nd Infantry Division, serving in Europe, fared little better than the 93^rd in the eyes of the military. The 370^th Regimental Combat Team, part of the 92^rd Infantry Division, also retreated while under attack from enemy forces. Early in the Allies’ campaign in Massa, Italy the 370^th was under constant attack by German artillery as it made its way up Mount Cauala. At one point the 370^th starting moving back down the hill instead of up. The retreat, according to Ulysses Lee, set “the pattern for future 92^nd Division operations.”[183] On February 11, 1945, the 365^th Infantry was also forced to retreat before achieving their objective of taking the Lima di Sotto Ridge from German control.[184] Through out the operations in Massa different units of the 92^nd Regiment would be forced to fall back after meeting stiff resistance from German counter attacks. Ultimately, the 92^nd Division would not take Massa during the February campaign.[185]

The 92^nd Infantry Division would be subjected to the same criticisms the Army used to explain most of the African Americans’ failures as soldiers. The blame for the failures was placed squarely on the shoulders of African American enlisted men and officers by white officers.[186] It would have been difficult for the 93^rd Infantry to receive fair judgment with Major General Edward Almond as their commanding officer. Almond was openly hostile towards the African Americans under his command. Booker quotes two African American solider who stated that Almond, in a speech to the division, said he did not ask for African American soldiers and would make sure that they had their fair share of casualties.[187] Almost two years after Executive Order 9981 was issued, Almond, who would be promoted to Lieutenant General, instructed Major General Clark L. Ruffner to stop any further attempts of integrating the 9^th Regiment and to undo any changes that may have already been made.[188]

During the war, General Benjamin Davis, Sr., who worked on the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policy, wrote a detailed report to the Inspector General after he visited England where racial tension between white and African American soldiers had turned violent.[189] Davis stated that the cause of violence between the races was due to “the resentment of certain white soldiers against the association of British People, particularly the British women, with colored soldiers.”[190] Ultimately, Davis determined that the unit commanders were unable to control the men under their command and relied on the military police and other officers to maintain discipline.[191]

World War II, like World War I, was not spared from riots and violence directed towards African Americans by civilians and the military. In July 1944, a Durham, North Carolina bus driver killed an African American soldier after an argument broke out between the 2 men. In Kentucky, white policemen beat 3 African American women, members of the Women’s Army Corps, who were in the white-only waiting room of a Kentucky train station.[192]  In Freeman Field, Indiana, 100 African American officers were arrested after entering an all-white officers club.[193]

 In 1946, after serving fifteen months overseas, Private Isaac Woodward was on a bus headed to his home in North Carolina. It was during the bus drive that Woodward and the white bus driver had a verbal altercation. In Batesburg, South Carolina, the bus driver notified local police officers of the altercation.[194] Woodard, still in uniform, was escorted off of the bus and once out of sight of the bus was hit repeatedly with batons on the face and head.[195] While in police custody, Woodward received no medical attention for his wounds.[196] As a result of blows to the face, particularly the eyes, Woodward would become blind. The blinding of Isaac Woodward became a national story that lead to the involvement of the NAACP. Walter White brought the matter to Truman who, after hearing the story, ordered a full investigation.[197] The resulting investigation lead to federal charges being brought against the police officers involved. However, the trial ended with the acquittal of the police officers.[198]

In 1943 there was a movement among Franklin D. Roosevelt’s supporter in Washington to remove Henry A. Wallace as the vice-presidential running mate. Wallace had been Roosevelt’s Vice President during the president’s third term in office. However, Wallace held many unpopular, liberal ideas that alienated Roosevelt supporters, like Walter Lippmann, Harold Ickes, and James Byrnes. Among the many unpopular speeches Wallace made was one given on July 25, 1943 in Detroit, Michigan. Wallace said, in part:

We cannot fight to crush Nazi brutality abroad and condone race riots at home. Those who fan the fires of racial clashes for the purpose of making political capital here at home are taking the first step toward Nazism. We cannot plead for equality of opportunity for peoples everywhere and overlook the denial of the right to vote for millions of our own people. Every citizen of the United States without regard to color or creed whether he resides where he was born or whether he has moved to a great defense center or to a fighting front, is entitled to cast his vote.[199]

Speeches like these, along with other “radical” ideas, turned Southern Democrats and big city political bosses against Wallace. Southern Democrats, in 1940, did not like Wallace because he was too liberal. The big city political bosses “suspected him as a renegade Republican.”[200] By 1944 their opinion of Wallace had not changed.

Robert J. Donovan, in Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948, chronicles how Truman became the vice-president. In 1944, with Wallace’s re-nomination doubtful, there were three other possible candidates. Senator James Byrnes of South Carolina, William O. Douglas, an associate justice of the Supreme Court, and Harry Truman. As previously mentioned, Southern Democrats thought Wallace was too liberal and would lead the country to the political left.[201]  If for no other reason than Roosevelt’s side stepping the decision to nominate a vice-president, Wallace was out as a candidate.[202] Byrnes was not acceptable to the labor element of the Democratic Party who feared his political views would move the party to the right.[203] Douglas, other than being popular with Roosevelt, had no real backing for his nomination ever to get off the ground.

In order for Roosevelt to win the election, he had to “retain the confidence of the urban bosses and conservative southerners who were key elements of his coalition.”[204] Truman posed the least amount threat to a Roosevelt victory and, more importantly, Southern Democrats and the urban bosses both liked Truman as a vice-president.[205] Robert E. Hannegan, the Democratic National Chairman, also wanted Truman as the vice-president.[206] Robert H. Ferrell, author of Dear Bess: The Letters From Harry to Bess Truman, 1910-1959 and Harry S. Truman: A Life, has argued that Truman’s work on the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, investigating corruption in how military contracts were awarded, brought him to the attention of Roosevelt. How Truman dealt with these issues impressed all concerned parties enough to choose him over the other candidates.[207]

Harry S. Truman was Vice President of the United States for a total of eighty-five days. On April 12, 1945 Roosevelt suffered a stroke at his home in Warm Springs, Georgia and died. Truman became the 33^rd President of the United States. As the new president, Truman inherited a number of existing problems from the Roosevelt administration. The war was still being fought in Japan and Europe; among other issues Truman faced the were the decision of whether or not to use nuclear weapons on Japan, and how to handle civil rights issues—issues that were never fully address by Roosevelt.

By 1948, A Truman reelection victory was not a certainty. Truman’s reelection bid faced multiple challenges. President Roosevelt’s three sons, with the endorsements of Senators Claude Pepper and John C. Stennis, campaigned to convince Eisenhower to run for office.[208] Former Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes sent a letter to Truman asking him to not to run again for office and warning him that if he did run for another term Democrats would not vote for him. Ickes also accused Truman of destroying the Democratic Party.[209] Henry A. Wallace was running on the Progressive Party ticket using a pro-civil rights platform. Thomas Dewey, the Republic Party’s candidate, was also running on a civil rights platform. Truman also enraged the Southern Democrats within the party. Strom Thurmond, Senator from South Carolina, ran under the States’ Rights Party fighting to maintain traditional Southern beliefs. Given all this, the question becomes “Why did Truman with the election in question decided to pursue a civil rights course?”

Harvard Sitkoff has argued much of Truman’s stance on civil rights was a ploy to take African American votes away from Wallace and Dewey.[210] He saw the speeches Truman gave to the NAACP in June and then in August to a crowd of African Americans in Harlem as further attempts to gain votes.[211] Sitkoff has further argued that, beyond words, Truman failed to support civil rights measures in order to not lose Southern votes during the primary to the State’s Rights Party.[212]

Sitkoff has also argued that in the period before the States’ Rights Party failed to gain the support it would need to make a serious run at the White House, Truman did not fight for civil rights and had more civil rights failures that he did successes. According to Sitkoff, Truman failed to implement the finding the Committee on Civil Rights reported in To Secure These Rights because he thought “he could keep urban liberals and Negroes in the party’s ranks by public gestures without precipitating an open revolt by the South.”[213] In his message to Capitol Hill in February, Truman spoke on many civil rights issues. In his speech, Truman asked for the abolishment of the poll tax, to make lynching a federal crime, eliminate discrimination in the work place and in interstate commerce.[214] However, he never moved on any of these issues as a way of showing Southern Democrats he was not on a “crusade” for civil rights.[215] After forming the Committee on Civil Rights Truman avoided any further “overt acts” on the civil rights front in order to not “offend the southern whites in his party.”[216] When the State’s Rights Party failed to gain the support of a sufficient number of leading Democrats, Truman decided to move on civil rights.[217]

Much of the evidence for the importance of the African American vote Sitkoff bases his argument on are the papers and letters written by Clark Clifford, presidential advisor to Truman. However, Sitkoff makes no mention of the nearly15,000,000 independent voters who were also critical in the 1948 election.[218] In order to draw more votes to Truman, Clifford recommended that the failures of Congress should be linked to Dewey.[219] It is true, as Sitkoff points out, the African American vote was crucial in the election[220], but the votes of veterans and the working class were also crucial. Clifford states, “The larger effort of the campaign should be concentrated on the three groups mentioned above.”[221]

William C. Berman, in The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, views Truman’s civil rights record as a political necessity. Berman argues by the 1948 election, African Americans formed a voting block which could either be used to keep Truman in office or to send him packing. President Truman could not afford to lose their vote.[222] Berman further argues Truman’s signing of Executive Order 9981 was “timed perfectly…to undercut Wallace’s standing with many Negroes.”[223] Berman characterizes much of Truman’s civil rights legislation as political maneuvering. He has also argues that Truman would not take up a political cause if the risks outweighed the reward.[224] However, he does mention that by the time of the election many African Americans were convinced that Truman’s “advocacy of civil rights legislation was genuine.”[225]

In her critique of the Truman administration’s stance on civil rights, historian Carol Anderson has argued that Truman only did what Clarence Mitchell, labor secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and other African Americans had protested for and even then Truman fell far from the mark on advancing any civil rights for African Americans. In Anderson’s opinion, Truman is only a civil rights minded president when compared to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower whom she argues did little for African American civil rights.[226]

Anderson also feels that the Truman administration failed at any widespread gains in the area of civil rights. Anderson points out that even after To Secure These Rights was released, issues of racism in government mortgage lending were still rampant. African American voters in South were faced with a series of restriction making them ineligible to vote. When African American voters did attempt to vote they were intimidated and sometimes murdered.[227] These issues, Anderson claims, were never adequately investigated by Truman.

Even the case of Isaac Woodward does not stand up to Anderson’s criticism. While other historians think that the blinding of Isaac Woodward was just one of the many cases that inspired Truman to enact Executive Order 9981, Anderson only sees the lack of effort on the part of the Justice Department to prosecute the guilty parties.[228]  Anderson has argued that when it came to civil rights for African Americans, the federal government was not only “a disinterested bystander in the systematic denial of African Americans’ constitutional rights,” but in many cases was “a willing accomplice.”[229]

Anderson, Berman, and Sitkoff argue that Truman’s decision to enact Executive Order 9981 was based on the need to keep the African American vote in the 1948 election. African American votes were certainly a factor in Truman’s decision to enact Executive Order 9981, but it was not the only factor.

Historian Phillip McGuire has theorized that the work Hastie did, both as a government employee and as a private citizen, “may have been indirectly responsible” for Truman’s eventual issuing of Executive Order 9981.[230] Based on his civil rights voting record as a senator and his work as head of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, Truman would have been aware of Hastie’s recommendations to the Army. He would have also been aware of why Hastie resigned his position. As president, Truman subsequently appointed Hastie to the Federal Court of Appeals.

William Alexander Percy has argued that the successful integration of African American and white pilots in the Mediterranean, the wartime achievements of the 99^th Pursuit Squadron and the 33^rd Fighter Group “gave impetus to President Harry S. Truman’s integration of the U.S. armed forces in 1948.”[231] President Truman, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, would no doubt have been aware of the bond between the African American and white pilots as well as the accomplishments of the Tuskegee Airmen. The military’s theory that segregation was military effective was disproved in the interactions of African American and white pilots. According to Percy, the fact that African Americans and whites worked together professionally and got along together socially would not have been lost on Truman and would have been a major contributing factor in the order which called for equal treatment in the military.

McGuire and Percy view the decision to enact Executive Order 9981 differently from Sitkoff, Berman, and Anderson. McGuire and William Walker Percy have argued that the successful work of Judge William Hastie and the success of the Tuskegee Airmen influenced Truman’s decision.

Historians Sitkoff, Berman, and Anderson assert that Truman desegregated the military out of the need to amass a sufficient number of votes to win the 1948 election. Other historian like McGuire, and Percy argue that the work of Hastie and the valor of the Tuskegee Airmen provide some of the impetus Truman’s decision to enact Executive Order 9981.

The arguments of Sitkoff, Berman, Anderson, McGuire, and Percy all identify proximate causes that they argue explain the decision to desegregate the military. In Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks, Michael R. Gardner looks to Truman’s values to understand the decision. As the title makes clear, Gardner argues Truman’s policies on civil rights took moral courage to change how African Americans were being treated in the country.[232] Gardner has argued Truman “did not need political pressure to do what he felt was morally right and constitutional mandated for black Americans.”[233] Where other historians have mentioned that pressure from African American organizations like the NAACP, Gardner points to the fact that in 1947 the NAACP was in a  “relatively weak political position.”[234] Gardner argues there was no overwhelming pressure on Truman by African Americans to move forward on civil rights.[235] He also argues that Truman’s failed efforts in getting civil rights bills passed through Congress forced him to enact the executive order that would lead to the desegregation of the military.[236] According to Berman, Truman enacted the order based on his personal beliefs.[237]

This paper argues that one can understand Truman’s decision not only by looking at the proximate factors identified by Sitkoff, Berman, Anderson, McGuire, and Percy but by identifying more distant historical events that influenced and sustained the moral courage identified by Gardner. A particular expression of moral courage like 9981 does not occur in a vacuum but is influenced by the experiences of a lifetime. Beginning with his work as an officer in World War I, Truman was exposed to the experiences of African Americans in a military setting that ran counter to his upbringing as a son of a diehard Confederate sympathizer who believed in slavery.[238]

Partly in response to Du Bois’ “Closed Ranks” philosophy African Americans entered the US military in World War I, often being drafted in the place of whites who were given more deferments than African Americans. These soldiers faced their first set of problems when they were assigned to segregated training facilities that were often located in areas where Jim Crow laws were enforced. The discriminatory actions on behalf of the leadership that they faced in training remained with them when they arrived at the European front lines. Here the experiences of the small number of African Americans who were assigned to combat units were used to justify later racial policy in the armed forces.

Truman, as veteran of World War I, had direct knowledge of both the 368^th Regiment and the 369^th. The 369^th Regiment, assigned to the French who treated them as equals and provided them with effective training, outperformed the 368^th who was forced to retreat under wilting fire from the Germans. The fact that Truman as an officer in a division next to the 368^th Regiment took time to conduct his own investigation into why the 369^th Regiment performed better than the 368^th Regiment indicates that he knew there was a problem in the military. Truman concluded that military sanctioned segregation was the reason for the difference in performance of these two regiments. Truman also understood the reality of retreat when a white artillery battery under his command was forced to flee when German shelling became too much for them. Despite Truman’s analysis, the experience of the 368^th under fire influenced the military’s negative assessment of the potential for African Americans to fight when once again the United States was facing German troops in Europe during World War II.

Not only were there riots between African American soldiers and white civilians during World War I training, discrimination faced African Americans when they returned home at the war’s end. Soldiers who had fought to “make the world safe for democracy” in Europe expected improved conditions when they returned home. When faced with what they perceived as discrimination they sometimes worked to protect their rights and those of other African Americans. The result was a series of riots like the Tulsa Riot that destroyed Deep Greenwood.

The Army War College studies conducted in the interwar years provided justification for the military to continue enforcing segregation. As a Missouri Senator elected in 1934, Truman would have had access to these studies as he voted on military policy. The studies provided the military with what passed for “scientific” proof that African Americans were inferior to whites. Military officials used these studies to discriminate against African Americans and limit their involvement in the military despite a Post-Civil War law requiring the maintenance of four African American Regiments. These studies also institutionalized a second-class citizen status upon the African American soldier that was not deserved. These studies also gave cover to officers who managed to keep African Americans out of the Air Corps and the Marines and justification for Army and Navy personnel who wanted to use them simply as physical laborers and servants and when they had to use them in combat, see them fail.

African Americans adopted a different approach to the approaching entry of the United States into World War II than the “Closed Ranks” philosophy they held in World War II. As the result of the lack of improvement in race relations in the interwar period, leaders like A. Philip Randolph adopted a Double “V” campaign: victory overseas and victory at home. Their pressure brought about changes under the Roosevelt administration that increased opportunities for African Americans in industries that held government contracts, greatly improving the economic situation of many African American families. The military, however, refused most, but not all, attempts to change the role of African Americans.

Though discrimination/segregation continued to be enforced during World War II, such was not universally the case. Some leaders, under the need for increased manpower, enlarged the role of African Americans in combat situations. When adequately trained and led by officers who recognized their abilities, African Americans performed well in combat engagements like the Battle of the Bulge and the air war in Europe. To Secure These Rights, a report stemming from the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, mentions Report No. ETO-82 of the Research Branch contains the overall positive feelings of white soldiers who had fought with African American soldiers. The white soldiers positive experience with fighting alongside African Americans, in addition to the success of the Tuskegee Airmen, should be seen as another factor in Truman’s decision to enact Executive Order 9981. It was further proof that the military’s long-standing argument that segregation worked and that the soldiers wanted to maintain segregation was not universally true.

Even Truman’s own voting record demonstrates his willingness to support civil rights legislation. As a senator, Truman supported the Costigan-Wagner Anti-lynching bill and anti-poll tax legislation. Truman spoke out against the lack of job opportunities for African Americans and was vocal about the rights of African Americans to education. Truman supported Senator Wagner’s antidiscrimination amendment to the Selective Service and Training Act. He had worked on the committee to fund the Fair Employment Practice Committee that only had funding through the President’s Emergency Fund.[239] Truman supported legislation introduced in 1939 that allowed African Americans to train under the Civilian Pilot Training Program.[240] Some of the students in the program would go on for more training in Tuskegee, Alabama and would become members of the 99^th Pursuit Squadron. In 1941, Truman introduced a bill on behalf of the NAACP that, had it passed, would have given a combat command to General Benjamin Davis.[241] In 1943, Truman voted to have a study conducted into the effects of “segregation on the opportunities of Negroes in the armed services.”[242]

Shortly before casting his vote in support of the Civilian Pilot Training Program Truman met with two African Americans who flew from Chicago to DC in their own plane. The pilots, self-taught aviators, made the symbolic trip as a reminder to include African Americans in the training program. When Truman met the two pilots he was reported to having said to them that if the pilots “had the guts to do all that, he had guts enough to back them.”[243]

During the 1940 election, Truman gave speeches in Sedalia, Missouri and in Chicago in which he spoke in defense of the rights of African Americans. In Sedalia, Truman gave one of his more famous speeches on civil rights in America. Truman said, “If any class of race can be permanently set apart from or pushed down below the rest in political and civil rights, so may any class or race when it shall incur the displeasure of its more powerful associates, and we may say farewell to the principles on which we commit our safety.”[244] In Chicago, at the National Colored Democratic Association, Truman warned that if the rights of African Americans were not recognized and supported there would be a crisis in the United States.[245]

In 1946, Truman enacted Executive Order 9980 which called for the formation of the Committee on Civil Rights in order to investigate the civil rights of minorities and how to strength and protect those rights. The Committee’s report, To Secure These Rights, called for federal protection of black voting rights, enforcement of anti-lynching laws, and an end to segregation in schools, housing, and public facilities.[246] Although many of these changes were not made until years later, these actions clearly established Truman as someone who was concerned for all Americans, not just a certain segment of the population. On July 26, 1948 Truman issued Executive Order 9981which called for the “equal treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.”[247] Executive Order 9981 has been called “the most stunning achievement of the Truman era in the field of civil rights.”[248]

The debate over whether or not Truman enacted Executive Order 9981 simply for votes may never end. However, it should not be assumed that African American votes were the only reason Truman enacted what William Berman has called “the framework that could make possible a major breakthrough in race relations.”[249] As has been shown in this paper, there were many different factors that ultimately lead to Truman’s signing of Executive Order 9981, votes being only one of those factors.

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[1] William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in Truman Administration (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1970), Alonzo. H. Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (new York: Oxford University Press, 1995), Alan L. Gropman, The Air Force Integrates: 1945-1964, 2^nd ed. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1998). Ronald Takaki, Double Victory: A Multi Cultural History of America in World War II (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2000). Morris J. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces: 1940-1965 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1981).

[2] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002). Richard M. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1969).

[3] Mark Ellis, “"Closing Ranks" and "Seeking Honors": W. E. B. Du Bois in World War I,” The Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (June 1992): 98.

[4] Ibid., 100.

[5] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 108.

[6] Ibid., 108.

[7] Paul T. Murray, “ Blacks and the Draft: A History of Institutional Racism,” The Journal of Black Studies 2, no. 1 (September 1971).

[8] Ibid., 58.

[9] Ibid., 59.

[10] Ibid., 60.

[11] Ibid., 58-61.

[12] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 112.

[13] Bobby A. Wintermute, “The African-American Experience in World War I,” in Personal Perspectives: World War I, ed. Timothy Dowling (New York: ABC_CLIO, LLC, 2006), 14.

[14] Peter N. Nelson, A More Unbending Battle: The Harlem Hellfighters’ Struggle for Freedom in WWI and Equality at Home (New York, Basic Civitas Books, 2009), 33.

[15] Bobby A. Wintermute, “The African-American Experience in World War I,” in Personal Perspectives: World War I, ed., Timothy Dowling (New York: ABC_CLIO, LLC, 2006), 9.

[16] Ibid., 32.

[17] Ibid., 9.

[18] Peter N. Nelson, A More Unbending Battle: The Harlem Hellfighters’ Struggle for Freedom in WWI and Equality at Home (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2009), 32.

[19] Ibid., 33.

[20] Bulletin No. 35 in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4 ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty, (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 277.

[21] Bobby A. Wintermute, “The African-American Experience in World War I,” in Personal Perspectives: World War I, ed., Timothy Dowling (New York: ABC_CLIO, LLC, 2006), 7.

[22] Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty, ed., Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4 (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 108.

[23] Bulletin No. 35 in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4 ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty, (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 277.

[24] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 116.

[25] “Documents of War” from The Crisis in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4 ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty, (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 282-3.

[26] Chad Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 168. http://reader.eblib.com.library.norwich.edu (accessed May 11, 2012).

[27] G.K. Wilson, “General Orders No. 40,” in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4 ed.  Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 280-81.

[28] Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954), 33.

[29] Richard S. Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918 (Baltimore: MD: The John Hopkins University,2008), 4-5.

[30] Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, Blacks in the Military (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982), 17.

[31] John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr.,, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 331.

[32] Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954), 33.

[33] John Hope Franklin and Alfred A, Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 331.

[34] Ulysses, Lee, U.S. Army in World War II: The Employment of the Negro Troops, World War II 50th Anniversary (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1966) under “Bookshelves,” http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/11-4/index.html (accessed April 4, 2012).

[35] Chad Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 67. http://reader.eblib.com.library.norwich.edu (accessed May 11, 2012).

[36] Ibid., 68. (accessed May 11, 2012).

[37] Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954), 33.

[38] Chad Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 167. http://reader.eblib.com.library.norwich.edu (accessed May 11, 2012).

[39] Ibid., 138 (accessed May 11, 2012).

[40] Ibid., 142. (accessed May 10, 2012).

[41] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 116.

[42] Ibid., 116.

[43] Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954), 85.

[44] Richard S. Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918 (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 4.

[45] Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954), 85.

[46] Alonzo H. Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 69.

[47] John Hope Franklin and Alfred A, Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 347.

[48] Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954), 37.

[49] Scott Ellsworth, Death in a Promised Land: The Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 57.

[50] John Hope Franklin and Alfred A, Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 349-52.

[51] Ibid., 353.

[52] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 128.

[53] Ibid., 128.

[54] Major General J.G. Harbord, “Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General”, in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4, ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 371.

[55] Ibid., 371.

[56] P.C. Harris, “Circular No. 355 Discontinuance of Enlistments for Colored Calvary” in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4, ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 367.

[57] Peyton C. March, Circular No. 392 Discontinuance of Enlistments of Colored Men-Amendment to Circular No. 355, War Department, 1919,” in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4, ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 369.

[58] Major General J.G. Harbord, “Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General”, in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4, ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 373.

[59] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 128.

[60] Ibid., 129-30.

[61] Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 8.

[62] Ibid., 8.

[63] Ibid., 10-12.

[64] Ibid., 13.

[65] Ibid., 13.

[66] Ibid., 13.

[67] Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 22. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=96926346 (accessed April 21, 2012)

[68] Harry S. Truman, “Executive Order 9981,” in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 8, ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 687.

[69] Ulysses, Lee, U.S. Army in World War II: The Employment of the Negro Troops, World War II 50th Anniversary (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1966) http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/11-4/index.html (accessed April 14, 2012).

[70] Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 2.

[71] Ibid., 5.

[72] Ibid.,5.

[73] U.S. Army War College, "The Army War College Studies Black Soldiers," in HERB by ASHP, Item #808, http://herb.ashp.cuny.edu/items/show/808 (accessed April 16, 2012).

[74] Alan L. Gropman, The Air Force Integrates: 1945-1964, 2^nd ed. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1998), 2. Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 5.

[75] Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 2.

[76] U.S. Army War College, "The Army War College Studies Black Soldiers," in HERB by ASHP, Item #808, http://herb.ashp.cuny.edu/items/show/808 (accessed April 16, 2012).

[77] Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 2.

[78] Ibid., 6.

[79] Alan L. Gropman, The Air Force Integrates: 1945-1964, 2^nd ed. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1998), 3.

[80] Ibid., 2.

[81] Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 17.

[82] Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 5.

[83] Alan L. Gropman, The Air Force Integrates: 1945-1964, 2^nd ed. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1998), 5.

[84] C. Loring Brace, “Race” is a Four-Letter Word: The Genesis of the Concept (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 211-13.

[85] Ibid., 212.

[86] Ibid., 208.

[87] Ibid., 206.

[88] Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 17.

[89] Ibid., 18.

[90] C. Loring Brace, “Race” is a Four-Letter Word: The Genesis of the Concept (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 219.

[91] Ibid., 220.

[92] Ibid.,221.

[93] Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 17.

[94] Ulysses, Lee, U.S. Army in World War II: The Employment of the Negro Troops, World War II 50th Anniversary (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1966), 45. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/11-4/index.html (accessed April 18, 2012).

[95] Ibid., 45. (accessed April 18, 2012).

[96] Vernon A. Caldwell, “Letter to the Assistant Commandant of the General Staff College”, in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4 ed.  Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 342-45.

[97] Ibid., 343.

[98] Ibid., 345.

[99] W.C.Sweeney, “Memorandum for the Commandant of the Army War College,” in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4 ed.  Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 353-4.

[100] Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 20.

[101] Bryan D. Booker, African Americans in the United States Army During World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 2008), 45.

[102] Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 21.

[103] Ibid., 20.

[104] Bernard C. Nalty, Long Passage to Korea: Black Sailors and the Integration of the U.S. Navy (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 2003), 15.

[105] Ulysses, Lee, U.S. Army in World War II: The Employment of the Negro Troops, World War II 50th Anniversary (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1966), 63. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/11-4/index.html (accessed April 16, 2012).

[106] Ibid., 63.

[107] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 107.

[108] Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954), 33.

[109] Ulysses, Lee, U.S. Army in World War II: The Employment of the Negro Troops, World War II 50th Anniversary (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1966), 142. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/11-4/index.html (accessed April 19, 2012).

[110] Ibid., 142.

[111] Donald R. McCoy and Richard R. Ruetten, Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1973), 9.

[112] Ronald, Takaki, Double Victory: A Multicultural History of American in World War II (Little, Brown, and Company, 2000), 41-42..

[113] Bryan D. Booker, African Americans in the United States Army During World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 2008), 47.

[114] Ibid., 47.

[115] Donald R. McCoy and Richard R. Ruetten, Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1973), 11.

[116] William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 1970), 6.

[117] Johnpeter Horst Grill and Robert L. Jenkins, “The Nazis and the American South in the 1930s: A Mirror Image?,” The Journal of Southern History 58, no. 4 (November 1992): 690.

[118] Richard Dalfiume, “Military Segregation and the 1940 Presidential Election,” Phylon 30, no. 1 (1st Quarter 1969): 45.

[119] Ibid., 45.

[120] Richard M. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969) 26. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=96926346 (accessed April 22, 2012).

[121] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 136-7.

[122] Bryan D. Booker, African Americans in the United States Army During World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 2008), 41.

[123] Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 5 ed.  Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 21.

[124] Senate Debate on Senator Robert H. Wagner’s Antidiscrimination Amendment to the Selective Training and service Act in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 4 ed.  Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 529.

[125] Ibid., 529.

[126] Ibid., 535.

[127] Bryan D. Booker, African Americans in the United States Army During World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 2008), 41.

[128] Ibid., 41.

[129] Ibid., 43.

[130] Ibid., 43.

[131] Ibid., 45.

[132] Ibid., 42.

[133] Alan L. Gropman, The Air Force Integrates: 1945-1964, 2^nd ed. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1998), 5-6.

[134] Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 42.

[135] Bryan D. Booker, African Americans in the United States Army During World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 2008), 42-3.

[136] Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 39. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=96926346 (accessed April 21, 2012)

[137] Ibid., 41 (accessed May 12, 2012).

[138] Bryan D. Booker, African Americans in the United States Army During World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 2008), 44.

[139] Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 42. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=96926346 (accessed May 12, 2012)

[140] Phillip McGuire, “Judge Hastie World War II, and Army Racism,” The Journal of Negro History 62, no. 4 (October 1977): 357.

[141] William Hastie, “Survey and Recommendations Concerning the Integration of the Negro Soldier into the Army,” in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 5, ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 100.

[142] Ibid., 101.

[143] Ibid.,  80.

[144] Ibid., 81.

[145] Ibid., 85.

[146] Ibid., 100.

[147] Phillip McGuire, “Judge Hastie World War II, and Army Racism,” The Journal of Negro History 62, no. 4 (October 1977): 354.

[148] Ibid., 355-6.

[149] William H. Hastie, interview by Jerry N. Hess, January 5, 1972. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/hastie.htm (accessed April 22, 2012).

[150] Ronald Takaki, Double Victory: A Multicultural History of American in World War II (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2000), 33.

[151] Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 84. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=96926346 (accessed May 12, 2012)

[152] Ibid., 85.

[153] Ibid.

[154] John Hope Franklin and Alfred A, Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 438-9.

[155] Ibid., 444.

[156] Ibid., 445.

[157] Bernard C. Nalty, Long Passage to Korea: Black Sailors and the Integration of the Navy (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 2003), 24.

[158] John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr.,, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 439.

[159] Paul Stillwell, ed., The Golden Thirteen (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1993), xx.

[160] Ibid., xx-xxi.

[161] Bernard C. Nalty, Long Passage to Korea: Black Sailors and the Integration of the Navy (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 2003), 24.

[162] John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr.,, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 440.

[163] Ibid., 440.

[164] Paul Stillwell, ed., The Golden Thirteen (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1993), xxi-xxiv.

[165] William Alexander Percy, “ Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe During World War II,” The Journal of Military History 67, no. 3 (July 2003): 776.

[166] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 149.

[167] Ibid., 150-1.

[168] Ibid., 152.

[169] William Alexander Percy, “ Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe During World War II,” The Journal of Military History 67, no. 3 (July 2003): 789-90.

[170] Ibid., 793-94.

[171] MacGregor, Morris J. Integration of the Armed Forces: 1940- 1965. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1981.), Kindle e-book, Location 1059

[172] Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 142.

[173] John C.H. Lee, “Volunteers for Training and Assignment as Reinforcements,” in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 5, ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 505.

[174] Ibid., 505.

[175] MacGregor, Morris J. Integration of the Armed Forces: 1940- 1965. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1981.), Kindle e-book, Location 1079.

[176] Ibid., 1091.

[177] President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 83-85. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/civilrights/srights2.htm#79 (accessed May 9, 2012).

[178] Bryan D. Booker, African Americans in the United States Army During World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 2008), 177-80, 223-69.

[179] Ibid., 178.

[180] Ibid., 181.

[181] Ibid., 185.

[182] MacGregor, Morris J. Integration of the Armed Forces: 1940- 1965. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1981.), Kindle e-book, Location 2481.

[183] Ulysses, Lee, U.S. Army in World War II: The Employment of the Negro Troops, World War II 50th Anniversary (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1966), 547. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/11-4/index.html (accessed May 14, 2012).

[184] Bryan D. Booker, African Americans in the United States Army During World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 2008), 225.

[185] Ibid., 248.

[186] Ibid., 249.

[187] Ibid., 211.

[188] Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 227.

[189] Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 154-5.

[190] Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, “Memorandum to the Inspector General,” in Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents Vol. 5, ed., Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), 174.

[191] Ibid., 175.

[192] John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans Seventh Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 445.

[193] Ibid., 446.

[194] Andrew Myers, “The Blinding of Isaac Woodard,” Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association (2004): 64-6.

[195] Ibid., 65.

[196] Ibid., 66.

[197] Ibid., 67.

[198] Ibid., 69.

[199] Henry Wallace, Democracy Reborn (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., 1944).  http://newdeal.feri.org/wallace/haw20.html (accessed march 25, 2012).

[200] Richard J. Walton, Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 7.

[201] Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1977), xi.

[202] Ibid., x.

[203] Ibid., xi.

[204] John C. Culver and John Hyde. American Dreamer: The Life and Times of Henry A. Wallace (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), 313.

[205] Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1977), xi.

[206] Ibid., x.

[207] Robert H. Ferrell, Dear Bess: The Letters From Harry to Bess Truman, 1910-1959. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1983), 455.

[208] Julian M. Pleasants, “Claude Pepper, Strom Thurmond, and the 1948 Presidential Election in Florida,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 76, no. 4 (Spring, 1998): 449-50.

[209] Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948 , (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1977), 388-9.

[210] Harvard Sitkoff, “Harry Truman and the Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights in American Politics,” The Journal of Southern History 37, no. 4 (November 1971): 598.

[211] Ibid., 599.

[212] Ibid., 612.

[213] Ibid., 600.

[214] Ibid., 600.

[215] Ibid., 601.

[216] Ibid., 599..

[217] Ibid., 612.

[218] Clark Clifford to Harry S. Truman, August 17, 1948. Political File, Clifford Papers. Harry S. Truman Library and Museum http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/1948campaign/large/docs/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1948-08-17&documentid=1-2&studycollectionid=Election (accessed May 4, 2012)

[219] Ibid.

[220] Harvard Sitkoff, “Harry Truman and the Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights in American Politics,” The Journal of Southern History 37, no. 4 (November 1971): 597,613.

[221] Clark Clifford to Harry S. Truman, August 17, 1948. Political File, Clifford Papers. Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/1948campaign/large/docs/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1948-08-17&documentid=1-2&studycollectionid=Election  (accessed May 15, 2012)

[222] William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1970), x.

[223] Ibid., 117.

[224] Ibid., 29.

[225] Ibid., 123.

[226] Carol Anderson, “Clutching at Civil Rights Straws: A Reappraisal of the Truman Years and the Struggle for African American Citizenship,” in Harry’s Farwell, ed. Rich Kirkendall (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 75.

[227] Ibid., 85.

[228] Ibid., 92.

[229] Ibid., 80.

[230] Phillip McGuire, “Judge Hastie World War II, and Army Racism,” The Journal of Negro History 62, no. 4 (October 1977): 359.

[231] William Alexander Percy, “ Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Flying Forces in Europe During World War II,” The Journal of Military History 67, no. 3 (July 2003): 810.     

[232] Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), 3.

[233] Ibid., 12.

[234] Ibid., 31.

[235] Ibid., 19.

[236] Ibid., 105-6.

[237] Ibid., 33.

[238] Ibid., 1.

[239] Ibid., 13-15.

[240] Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 136. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=96926346 (accessed April 25, 2012)

[241] Ibid., 136. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=96926346 (accessed May 3, 2012)

[242] Ibid., 136. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=96926346 (accessed May 3, 2012)

[243] Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, Inc., 1954), 83.

[244] William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1970), 12.

[245] Donald R. McCoy and Richard R. Ruetten, Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1973), 15.

[246] The President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947). http://www.trumanlibrary.org/civilrights/srights1.htm#VII (date accessed march 25, 2012.)

[247] The President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Freedom to Serve: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services (Washington, DC, 1950). http://www.trumanlibrary.org/civilrights/freeserv.html (date accessed march 25, 2012).

[248] Donald R. McCoy and Richard R. Ruetten, Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1973), 221.

[249] William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1970), 117.